Bureaucracy that Kills: Federal Sovereign Immunity and the Discretionary Function Exception by Longoria, Thomas
American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 2 June 2002
Bureaucracy that Kills: Federal Sovereign Immunity
and the Discretionary Function Exception
WILLIAM G. WEAVER University of Texas at El Paso
THOMAS LONGORIA University of Kansas
Political scientists normally discuss sovereign immunity in the context of international law andrelations. The domestic effects of sovereign immunity are almost never examined, even thoughthose effects are profound and implicate a range of issues of interest to political scientists. The
Federal Tort Claims Act (FCTA) (1946) is a main waiver of federal sovereign immunity and is designed
to allow people injured by government employees to sue for money damages. The FTCA has a number
of exceptions, the most prominent of which is known as the “discretionary function exception.” This
exception retains sovereign immunity for the United States when a federal employee acts “based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . .whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.” This simple exception expanded into a comprehensive tool of
government that now confounds justice and federal governmental accountability.
On April 16, 1947, a ship anchored in the harborof Texas City, the Grandcamp, exploded, lev-eling most of the city, killing 576 people, and
injuring five thousand more. Destined for Europe as
part of the Marshall Plan, the Grandcamp had more
than 1,850 tons of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate
(FGAN) aboard, along with a heavy load of commer-
cial explosives. When the captain of the Grandcamp
saw smoke coming from a hold of the ship, he ordered
the hatches battened and injected steam into the cargo
area to quell the fire. This was normal procedure for
fires in holds, but unfortunately those administering
the fertilizer program neglected to warn the captain
that FGAN is an oxidizing agent and does not need
any external oxygen for combustion. The heat and the
pressure created by the spontaneous combustion, the
steam, and the battened hold caused the FGAN to
explode.
Federally owned munitions factories that less than
two years before the disaster had been turning out ord-
nance to be dropped on Europe now manufactured
fertilizer to be spread on its fields. A private com-
pany would have been liable for the damage and in-
jury caused by the explosions, but the United States
escaped liability through a little-known provision of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) (1946). The govern-
ment had the FGAN bagged at extremely high temper-
atures, usually 200◦F (Dalehite v. U.S. 1952 [hereafter
Dalehite], 40), and administrators knew perfectly well
the dangerous propensities of the fertilizer and about
incidents of FGAN undergoing spontaneous combus-
tion and exploding (66–7). Even more, there were no
warnings on the fertilizer bags, and stevedores, cargo
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masters, and ship captains were not informed about
the properties of FGAN. Most telling, administrators
halted safety testing of the fertilizer when contract lab-
oratories told them that, under procedures adopted by
the government, it looked as if the FGAN would pose
substantial danger to the public (66).
The Discretionary Function Exception (DFE)
(FTCA 1946, sec. 2680(a)) to the FTCA protects the
federal government from liability when policy deci-
sions or actions of agencies or employees injure people.
Growing out of the doctrines of sovereign immunity
and separation of powers, the exception specifically
applies “whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.” In Dalehite, the DFE saw its first use to protect
the U.S. Government from liability, and it succeeded
magnificently, turning out to be just the beginning in a
long train of success. The DFE gives rise to several im-
portant and interesting questions concerning its scope
and use. But beyond these matters, it provides a con-
crete example for examining contending understand-
ings of the role of judges in controlling bureaucracy,
influencing policy formulation, and bringing adminis-
trators to account for their actions.
Debates over judicial control of bureaucracy are con-
tentious and long-standing. In the 1950s and 1960s a
small but influential group of scholars sought diverse
means to limit administrative discretion and indepen-
dence. This group included Henry Friendly (1962),
Walter Gellhorn and Clark Byse (1974), Louis Jaffe,
Kenneth Culp Davis, and others, but Jaffe and Davis
are perhaps the most important authors for the present
concerns.
In Judicial Control of Administrative Action, Jaffe
(1965) presented a powerful view of the relationship
between courts and administrators. He reacted against
New Deal antijuridical views of public administration
theorists, who believed that “if any person is to count
for less than one . . . it is the lawyer” and that the lawyer
suffered from a “meager social outlook,” represent-
ing “everything stultifying” (Waldo 1948, 79). To these
New Deal theorists, in administrative agencies “thor-
oughly motored and controlled by rational elabora-
tion,” judicial review and incursion into the sphere of
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the administrator were not only disruptive but also
unjust (Jaffe 1973, 1186). Born in this crucible of an-
tilegalism, the DFE first appeared in proposed legisla-
tion in 1942 (H.R. 6463), to help prevent what some
commentators referred to as judicial “sabotage of the
administrative process” (Blachly and Oatman 1946,
213). Testifying concerning this bill, an assistant at-
torney general asserted that the DFE preserved ad-
ministrative autonomy to conduct “legally authorized
activity” and protected agencies against “alleged abuse
of discretionary authority” (U.S. Congress, House 1942,
33). The exception, therefore, is steeped in the coun-
terjuridical impulse of New Deal administrative theory
and is a vestige of an exuberant faith in administrative
expertise.
Against the New Deal impulse, Jaffe implored judges
to take a “hard look” approach to administrative
decision-making. In piquant language, he noted that
historically judges have been “adept . . . at removing
the hide of an administrative agency” and that the
“glint of the scalpel is still detectable behind the vo-
luminous folds of [judges’] robes” (Jaffe 1965, 565).
Judicial surgery on administrative agencies is precisely
what Jaffe was after, and to achieve this he had to
discredit the tendency to deference adopted by judges
when reviewing administrative decisions. He saw ju-
dicial review of agency action as the necessary moral
countervailing force to the scientism of administration
theory and stated that “the touchstone of rejecting an
administrative decision is the sense of the judge that it is
unfair” (Jaffe 1951, 1245). And he termed the New Deal
sentiment that agencies should be free of judicial “sab-
otage” a “heresy” (1259).
Davis likewise authored powerful tracts arguing for
control of administrative power, but he focused more
narrowly than Jaffe on the mechanics of discretion
and disfavored the cumbersome, formalized process
of court review of administrative action. Davis (1969,
v) saw that injustice at the hands of administrators is
directly proportional to the amount of discretion float-
ing free in agencies. He believed that earlier efforts
to eliminate or severely constrict administrative dis-
cretion actually achieved the opposite result (27–51)
and that courts should not try to control discretion
directly, but to channel legislators and administrators
into avenues of effective rulemaking (220–1). Judicial
review in America is too geared to large interests, and
the transaction costs of going to court mean that “the
system frequently fails to take care of parties with small
interests” (155). By “parties with small interests,” Davis
meant poor, helpless, and troubled people. With appro-
priate planning and distribution of discretion, these are
precisely the sorts of interests that administrators are
most effective at serving. The problem, Davis said, is
not so much providing substantial discretion to admin-
istrators, but how intelligently to circumscribe discre-
tionary power and make sure only the optimal amount
of discretion for performance of mandated functions
is in the hands of agencies. Our system, Davis said, is
in “imbalance”; it is “saturated with excessive discre-
tionary power which needs to be confined, structured,
and checked” (27).
More recently, some theorists have gone further than
Davis, keeping the opposition to New Deal adminis-
trative theory, but embracing New Deal antilegalism in
formulating solutions to problems of agency control.
These thinkers believe that oversight of administrators
need not come from courts; “judicial participation in
the administrative process is not indispensable” (Krent
1997, 1187), and though the impulse to “exercise review
over discretionary administrative action is understand-
able, the consequences can be perverse” (1189). But the
DFE often arises when administrative incentives are at
their worst. Because it provides a shield not only from
liability, but also often from discovery, there is an incen-
tive to employ the exception to avoid embarrassment
and disclosure of information that would trigger action
adverse to agency interests. The DFE is at odds with the
work of both Jaffe and Davis, for it frequently protects
administrators and their agencies when they wield their
discretion most unwisely or even maliciously.
The FTCA can be a powerful tool for controlling
agency discretion. As Rosenbloom (2001) notes, it is
one of several steps taken by Congress in 1946 to rede-
fine the relationship among Congress, the judiciary, and
the bureaucracy in the postwar era. This “legislative-
centered” view of public administration acknowledges
that administration has legislative functions, that agen-
cies serve as extensions of Congress, that administra-
tion should be informed by political authority, and
that Congress has oversight and supervisory roles. This
view also acknowledges not only that the president and
political appointees are charged with day-to-day im-
plementation of statutorily authorized functions, but
also that administrators have discretion to formulate
action where Congress has not provided explicit di-
rection (Rosenbloom 2001, 776). Significant in Rosen-
bloom’s perspective is that Congress, at a time when
it attempted to reclaim control over the bureaucracy,
sought to transfer responsibility for determining gov-
ernmental liability to the judiciary. Rosenbloom (2001,
776), from a largely normative position, argues that it is
the primary role of the federal courts to “provide judi-
cial review of agency actions” to prevent the exercise of
discretion Congress intended to prohibit. On this view,
the FTCA not only transferred determination of fed-
eral governmental tort liability to the judiciary, but also
sought to make the judiciary partners with Congress in
oversight of administrative action.
As discussed more thoroughly below, one of the rea-
sons Congress moved to abandon the private bill system
is that it was inefficient. It is generally unwise, though,
to rely on federal courts to resolve disputes between
citizens and government effectively, and it may not be
reasonable in light of weaknesses identified in the judi-
cial branch in areas of policymaking. Effective policy-
making requires capacities such as technical expertise
and the ability to conduct long-range planning and pub-
lic policy analysis that facilitate effective implementa-
tion, capacities that courts do not possess (Rosenberg
1991, 20). As Rosenberg observes, the efficacy of ju-
dicial action is questioned even in areas normally
thought to be exemplary instances of the federal courts
as effective promoters of social and policy change:
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areas such as civil rights, voting rights, and women’s
rights (20).
Rosenberg’s “constrained court” perspective is well
supported by evidence and forces a balanced ap-
proach to understanding the policymaking role of fed-
eral courts vis-à-vis other branches of government.
However, in the case of the DFE, the issue is not about
whether judges can effect broad social change by tak-
ing on roles as policymakers. In cases where the DFE
is raised, the courts are playing a role that they are
accustomed to and very well equipped to fulfill. The
claims are taken to the courts on relatively narrow legal
grounds, the decisions rendered by the courts do not
require ongoing enforcement and oversight, and such
decisions do not directly alter agency policy and prac-
tice. And while the speed, efficiency, and narrow focus
of court action are ongoing concerns, suits under the
FTCA are usually the only remedy available to citizens
harmed by the government.
The DFE is at war with justice, and the question is
who should be in the fight. Although judicial control of
bureaucracy presents many intractable problems and
dangers, we believe that the courts should construe the
DFE narrowly, far more narrowly than at present, to
maximize judicial review of administrative action. We
argue this for several reasons. First, the FTCA substan-
tially commits oversight of administrative action for in-
juries caused to citizens to the judiciary. Second, when
the DFE is raised it is often in cases where great harms
have been committed and administrators are trying to
avoid embarrassment or disclosure of revealing infor-
mation about policies and procedures. In such cases,
oversight cannot be left to the agencies, and it is dubi-
ous to depend on congressional intervention. Third, by
their very nature, FTCA cases concern injuries inflicted
on citizens at the hands of government. Determination
of legal liability for tortious conduct is one of the most
common and routinized activities in the legal system,
and courts are extremely adept at adjudicating such
cases. Here the courts are on sure footing compared
to that in administrative oversight cases arising under
other statutes that entangle the judiciary more deeply in
agency action. Fourth, finding liability under the FTCA
is not a direct review of agency policy and practice; no
court tells an agency to change a policy or procedure or
adopt new standards. When the court finds liability, it,
at worst, forces the offending agency administrators to
make a calculation of whether to maintain the policy or
action that caused the injuries or to make changes. This
decision is left to the agency and not the court. Finally,
we note that FTCA cases are generally “large interest,”
rather than Davis’s “small interest,” cases and, there-
fore, presumably more amenable to legal resolution.
The DFE is an anachronism sandwiched into an
ideal. On the one hand, the FTCA represents a land-
mark in governmental acceptance of responsibility and
efforts to reduce injustice. On the other hand, the DFE
and other exceptions to liability in the FTCA are ves-
tiges of an age of credulous faith in the expert adminis-
trator. Congress passed the FTCA on the cusp between
two eras, between the twilight of New Deal faith in
the expert agency and the bare beginnings of an era
of profound distrust of administrative discretion; the
FTCA reflects both of these eras.
It is also important to know if the DFE is having
a substantial effect on our constitutional system and
on means of governmental accountability. Although
broadened by the FTCA, the exception performs a
crucial function in our constitutional system and has
long been held by federal courts to be implied in the
Constitution. As Justice Marshall observed in Marbury
v. Madison (1803, 170), “The province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to en-
quire how the executive, or executive officers, perform
duties in which they have a discretion.”
Where the DFE applies, there is no remedy for gov-
ernmental abuse, regardless of its seriousness. Indeed,
the greater the injury inflicted by the government, the
more likely the DFE will be proffered to the courts to
immunize agencies, employees, and the United States
from liability (Axelrad 2000). To give some idea of the
breadth of the DFE, it immunizes the government for
the following.r Allegedly hiding knowledge of a murder by an in-
mate, securing the inmate’s release, and then mis-
leading state law enforcement authorities as he kills
five additional people (Taitt v. U.S. 1983).r Placing a known embezzler in the Witness Protec-
tion Program and allowing him to become CEO of a
publicly held company, even though he is currently
under investigation for defrauding another publicly
held company. He steals $1.5 million (Jet Industries,
Inc. v. U.S. 1984).r The CIA setting up a dummy investment corpora-
tion, placing a known swindler in charge of the orga-
nization who then, with government knowledge, bilks
private investors out of millions of dollars (Frigard v.
U.S. 1988).r The exposure of military and civilian personnel to
pesticides, botulinum toxin, and unapproved vac-
cines without their knowledge, causing birth defects
in children born to exposed parents (Minns v. U.S.
1997).r Knowingly exposing thousands of employees, mili-
tary personnel, and private citizens to ionizing radi-
ation, failing to inform or warn the victims of their
exposure, and using them as ”guinea pigs” in long
range studies of the effects of radiation exposure
(Allen v. U.S. 1987; Consolidated Atmospheric Test-
ing, in re 1987).r Conducting a simulated biological attack on an un-
warned, unsuspecting San Francisco public utilizing
bacteria that causes death and injury (Nevin v. U.S.
1983).r Cremation and acid reduction of stolen bodies or
body parts for radiation assay and study without the
permission or knowledge of relatives.1
1 Project Sunshine, initiated at a 1953 Atomic Energy Commission
conference (see, e.g., Atomic Energy Commission 1953 and Rand
Corporation 1953) and lasting until 1985, took parts from cadavers
and whole bodies without the permission of relatives (see the Atomic
Energy Commission’s [1955, 8] discussion of the importance of “body
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The list could go on at quite some length. Despite its
consequences, the DFE is unaccountably ignored by
political scientists and is mentioned only occasionally,
usually in connection with international law and the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (Evans 1980, 951;
Falk 1965, 778; Leigh 1987, 949; Semmelman 1993, 290–
2). This is odd, since many issues central to political sci-
ence are implicated by the DFE: issues concerning ju-
dicial oversight of administrative decisions, separation
of powers, governmental accountability, intrusion into
the peace and dignity of citizens, and justice. To start
out, it will be helpful to sketch a history of sovereign
immunity as it relates to our analysis.
FROM “THE KING CAN DO NO WRONG”
TO “THE ADMINISTRATOR CAN
DO NO WRONG”
Historically, tyrannies and democracies alike fre-
quently refused to be legally accountable for the wrongs
committed by their officials. But governmental immu-
nity from legal action in a democracy, where the people
are sovereign, presents special problems. In the United
States, efforts to address these problems began in the
first Congress. In discussing whether a comptroller
of accounts should be empowered to hear and “ad-
just” claims against the United States, James Madison
thought that people turned down by the comptroller
should have a “right to petition the Supreme Court
for redress, and they should be empowered to do right
therein; this will enable [them] to carry [their] claim
before an independent tribunal” (Debates and Proceed-
ings in the Congress of the United States, 1, [1965], 612).
Sovereign immunity is one of the few areas of law that
remains undisturbed in a slumber of pre-Revolutionary
War theory. It is as absolute today in the United States
as it was in the England of George III, though the jus-
tifications for it have changed. The King and Queen
were ultra vires, extrajudicial, and so could not be sued
without their consent. Blackstone made this point suc-
cinctly in his well-known statement: “[B]esides the at-
tribute of sovereignty the law also ascribes to the king,
in his political capacity, absolute perfection. The king
can do no wrong” (Ehrlich 1959, 67). And as Pollock
and Maitland ([1895] 1968, 516) observe, “If Henry III
had been capable of being sued, he would have passed
his life as a defendant.” Sovereign immunity extended
to government officials, and discretionary acts by ad-
ministrators in conformance with the Crown’s desires
or policies have always been protected. This extension
of immunity to the discretionary functions of admin-
istrators acting within the scope and authorization of
their duties served several important purposes.
First, it prevented elliptical attacks on the Crown’s
policies and desires by protecting those charged with
snatching”). Some 15 thousand bodies were mutilated or stolen under
this program (Philadelphia Enquirer 1995; Welsome 1998, 299–304).
Though, amazingly, apparently no suits were filed over Project Sun-
shine activities, it seems likely that the government would raise the
DFE as a defense in such an event.
their execution. A wronged or injured subject might
sue the administrator who caused the injury, but courts
would suspend judgment unless the King or Queen
specifically disclaimed the act of the administrator. If
the Crown claimed the act as its own, the administra-
tor was absolutely immune from legal action. By the
time of James I, efforts to close off access to legal
redress for injured subjects increased. For example, the
prefatory statement to a 1609 statute designed to dis-
courage suits against officers begins with the observa-
tion that “many causeless and contentious suits . . .have
been and daily are commenced [by] evil-disposed, con-
tentious persons . . . [and these suits are a] hindrance to
efficient administration” (Jaffe 1963, 10).
Second, if administrators, or those being recruited
for administrative positions, know that their decisions
will not place them at peril in suit, they are more likely
to accept government employment and to discharge
their duties more effectively. Administrators left un-
protected may make decisions based on their own per-
ceived risks, rather than in accord with their defined
duties.
Finally, the extension of sovereign immunity to the
actions of administrators safeguards the public trea-
sury from predation by means of damage awards. As
bureaucracy expanded with the reach of the British
Empire, so too did the number and severity of injuries
caused by governmental policies. Without immunity,
government and its administrators would have been
subject to enormous damages.
Nevertheless, a number of practices arose that al-
lowed suit both against the King or Queen eo nomine
and against the Crown’s officers. Beginning as early as
the reign of Edward I, the Crown made itself amenable
to suit in many circumstances (Jaffe 1963, 3). The King
and Queen, though, usually retained their immunity
from liability for the delicts of their servants, and pub-
lic administrators were not vicariously liable for the
actions of their employees. This doctrine is reaffirmed
time and again throughout English history, and a major
effort to overthrow it failed in 1865 (Feather v. Queen).
The effect of these rules was to secure administrators
and policies from judicial oversight and intrusion.
This view of sovereignty and the grant of immu-
nity to administrators leaped the Atlantic and set up
firmly in U.S. law. In the United States, with the fram-
ing of the Constitution an effort ensued to define the
U.S. Government clearly as a robust, unitary sovereign.
Hamilton, for example, in Federalist 81, wrote that
“it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent” (Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, and
John Jay [1788] 1961, 487). And Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793), Cohens v. Virginia (1821), McCulloch v.
Maryland (1819), and other cases pressed this issue,
with greater or lesser success. As John P. Roche (1961,
801) famously noted, increasing the power of the
sovereign was eminently practical under the circum-
stances of the founding: “In politics there are no im-
maculate conceptions, and . . .our very survival in the
Hobbesian jungle of world politics depended upon a re-
ordering and strengthening of our natural sovereignty.”
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Though present from the Founding, the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly embraced the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in 1821, when it noted that “[i]t
is an axiom in politics, that a sovereign and indepen-
dent State is not liable to the suit of any individual”
(Cohens v. Virginia 1821). And in 1907, Justice Holmes
gave a famous and succinct, if unsatisfactory, logical
justification for sovereign immunity: “[O]n . . . logical
and practical ground[s] . . . there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends” (Kawananakoa v. Polyblank 1907,
353). But from the beginning, the Republic shifted with
discomfort over the consequences sovereign immunity
and unchecked administrative discretion could bring
down on its citizens. In Poindexter v. Greenhow (1885,
291), Justice Matthews, writing for the Court, lamented,
Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right
for the security of individual liberty have been written, too
often, with the blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field
and the scaffold, if their limitations and restraints upon
power may be overpassed with impunity by the very agen-
cies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce
them. . . . The doctrine is not to be tolerated.
Despite discomfort with the unitary theory of the fed-
eral sovereign, the theory survived more or less intact
until the later years of the nineteenth century. Increas-
ingly, though, commentators derided the government’s
refusal to grant legal relief for people it injured. In
the latter portion of the nineteenth and beginnings of
the twentieth centuries, political scientists and others
began to attack the traditional view of sovereignty. In
1893, Ernst Freund subjected the unitary doctrine to
withering analysis. Freund (1893, 638) noted that “there
are evidently cases where justice demands the adjudi-
cation of rights against the state, while the logic of the
law apparently forbids it.” He thought that this appar-
ent conflict makes sense only if the state is viewed as a
unitary sovereign, which he thought to be a dangerously
simplistic view: “The state is an exceedingly complex or-
ganism, and its functions are widely divergent. . . . The
concentration of these various functions in one power
would be impossible without a separation of organs”
(638). Freund suggested that the regulative effects of
liability would act as a check on governmental activity
(647–8). These effects could be especially important
in the face of governmental expansion and more at-
tenuated control of administrative departments by the
president.
One of the chief rationales for sovereign immunity is
found in the sovereign’s supervisory responsibilities in
protecting the lives and properties of its subjects. The
sovereign needs to be free to act in the public good
without constant legal harassment that drains public
coffers and diverts resources to nonproductive work.
Given the multiplicity of activities and the complexity
of the federal government’s interaction with its citi-
zens and others, it is clear that oversight of activity has
been a major challenge to elected officials and presi-
dentially appointed administrators for well over a cen-
tury (Bibby 1966; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast
1989; Carpenter 1996). In the face of growing difficul-
ties in maintaining control over bureaucracy, Freund’s
analysis suggests that citizens could in effect regulate
government policy and practice through lawsuits and
money damages, discouraging administrators from un-
dertaking misdeeds.
Others were less elegant than Freund but just as
vehement, deriding sovereign immunity as an “anti-
quated relic” of a “barbarous and monistic rationalism”
(Elliott 1925, 476) and stating that “the case against
’the discredited state’ is one whose strength cannot and
ought not to be underestimated” (491). These senti-
ments echoed John Dewey, Mary Parker Follett (1919),
and other pragmatist thinkers, who saw sovereignty as
“a more or less shapeless wish, except as it finds ex-
pression in organized institutions” (Dewey 1894, 43).
Despite these assaults, at the dawn of the twentieth
century the U.S. Government was no more accountable
for the wrongful behavior of its administrators who hurt
citizens than was the crown of England. In the mount-
ing pressure to rethink sovereign immunity, the federal
courts began to look favorably on actions against gov-
ernment officials for equitable relief. Federal officials
were in theory subject to equitable action from the be-
ginning of the Republic, but the U.S. Supreme Court
extended this relief to allow for federally enforceable
injunctive relief against state officials (Young, ex Parte
1908). This leniency toward equitable actions followed
the English tradition exemplified in Rookes Case (1599,
210), which held that the use of administrative “discre-
tion is a science . . . and not to [be used] according to
[administrators’] wills and private affections.” But the
decision in Rookes did not concern money damages,
and it is clear that this holding would not apply where
the remedy is a judgment against the crown treasury.
One of the chief means, of course, of bringing the U.S.
Government to account is through injunctive relief, as
in the school desegregation and voting rights cases. But
there are important occasions when equitable remedies
are useless to secure a person’s rights against the federal
government. On such occasions money damages from
a suit in tort may provide the only means of bringing
the government and its administrators to account for
their actions. Along with enforcement of criminal laws,
the primary legal means for controlling behavior in our
society is through the application and threat of appli-
cation of monetary liability.
Because organizations tend to act in more pre-
dictable and rational ways than do people, the threat
of tort liability is often an effective deterrent to unde-
sirable behavior (Calabresi 1970; Coase 1960; Landes
and Posner 1987). Administrators and officers in orga-
nizations and institutions almost universally consider
potential liability in tort before undertaking policies,
producing products, or engaging in activities. This com-
prehensive reach of tort liability is comparatively re-
cent and tracks the growth in complexity and size of our
market-based economy and the products it produces.
But efforts to make the federal government account-
able in the form of tort liability have repeatedly stum-
bled on the arcane but vigorous doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Additionally, Congress’s consistent unwill-
ingness to visit the issue of federal liability except in
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specific, well-publicized cases foiled hopes of diminish-
ing the domestic effects of sovereign immunity.
Mass compensation schemes by Congress are mod-
ern remedies, and up until the passage of the FTCA
in 1946, the principal method the federal government
used to handle liability claims was the “private bill” sys-
tem. For most of the history of the United States, claims
against the states and the federal government were
not statutorily authorized but were handled through
legislative committees. This process distracted legis-
lators from their duty to work on behalf of all their
constituents and often resulted in great injustice or
justice delayed for years, or even decades. As one mem-
ber of Congress noted in 1878, “There are just claims
which have been before the Congress for half a cen-
tury, and been favorably considered in one Congress by
one house, and in another Congress by the other with-
out ever having received that concurrent action in any
Congress necessary to determine them” (U.S. Congress,
House 1878, 2). This system also had the effect of pre-
venting judicial oversight of administrative action that
caused injury to citizens. Despite the nuisance and in-
justice caused by the private bill system, Congress only
reluctantly took steps to abandon the institution.
PRIVATE BILLS AND THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
The use of private bills to compensate people injured or
killed by governmental actions proved to be unwieldy,
expensive, and unjust. In the first three U.S. Congresses
alone, members introduced 2,317 private bills for relief
(U.S. Congress, House 1848, 32). The Twenty-second,
Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Congresses saw 8,655
private bills, with 603 passing both houses, making for a
7% success rate (32). An 1848 House report on private
bills in the previous decade found that 16,573 bills were
introduced in the House, 3,436 reported out of com-
mittee, with only 910 passing both houses; a 5.5% suc-
cess rate (4). In the Seventy-sixth and Seventy-seventh
Congresses, about four thousand bills were introduced
and 908 approved, a success rate of about 23% (U.S.
Congress, House 1945, 2).
While Congress was apparently reaching more bills
by the time of these later sessions, it did so at great ex-
pense in time, money, and justice. Even as early as 1838,
a House report complained that “members elected to
participate in the examination and discussion of na-
tional subjects have devoted their time in the adjust-
ment of private claims” (U.S. Congress, House 1838,
1). Nearly a century later, private bills still cut deeply
into legislators’ time (U.S. Congress, House 1942, 9–10).
Frequently, the investigative and review committees
for private bills were composed of a single member, and
disagreements between members of Congress affected
the passage of claims for relief. Under the private bill
system, justice “awaits upon political considerations or
the popularity of a Congressman or the influence of a
Senator” (U.S. Congress, House 1942, 51). John Quincy
Adams opined, “There ought to be no private business
before Congress. [Private bills are] judicial business,
and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do
with [them]” (quoted in U.S. Congress, House 1942,
49). And a House report in 1878 declared in disgust,
“No tribunal can be less fitted to examine and decide
upon private claims than the Congress” (U.S. Congress,
House 1878, 1).
To alleviate the private bill problem, Congress exper-
imented with the Court of Claims, which it established
in 1855 (10 Stat. 612). This court represented a hy-
brid solution, midway between judicial and legislative
determination of compensation for victims. Congress
prohibited the Court from making legal determinations
about liability, and the Court could only make recom-
mendations to Congress about compensation for vic-
tims. This allowed members of Congress to “transfer
responsibility [for private bills to the Court of Claims]
but still make it possible for beneficial outcomes to be
attributed to individual legislators” (Hill and Williams
1993, 1012). Although Congress expanded the Court’s
power in 1863, the Court was still too limited and weak
to alleviate the glut of private bills. Abraham Lincoln
(1862) took to berating Congress for the mess it had
made in this area, saying, “It is as much the duty of
Government to render prompt justice against itself in
favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between
private individuals.” These words were eventually en-
graved on the Court of Claims building in Washington,
D.C.
Nevertheless, the problem continued unabated until
1922, when Congress passed the Small Tort Claims Act.
This act authorized the head of every federal depart-
ment or establishment to “consider, ascertain, adjust
and determine any claim” on account of damages to
or loss of privately owned property, up to one thou-
sand dollars, caused by the negligence of an officer or
employee of the U.S. Government. This statute led to
some strange and unjust results. For example, the gov-
ernment could be liable for the cost of a pocket watch
crushed by a federal employee but not for the life of the
person carrying it who was run down by a mail truck.
The explosion of federal employment during the
Depression and World War II put tremendous pres-
sure on Congress to enact an effective piece of leg-
islation that would remove claims for governmental
liability to the judiciary. After several stalled at-
tempts in the 1930s and early 1940s, legislators in the
Seventy-ninth Congress poised to pass a significant bill
waiving sovereign immunity in tort. Then-Attorney
General Robert Jackson recommended the FTCA for
passage, saying, “The subject of tort claims against the
government has long been a troublesome and vexa-
tious matter. . . . The . . . immunity of the Government
to suit in . . . torts does not seem to be warranted either
as a matter of principle or as a matter of justice” (U.S.
Congress, House 1945, 7). It astonishes that in pass-
ing this legislation Congress held no hearings, as the
bill promised to alter substantially the duties and func-
tioning of members of Congress and affect countless
thousands of constituents. It is true that Congress held
hearings in 1942 on a similar bill that failed because of
preoccupation with the war, but the FTCA represents
a significant change in the arrangement of power and
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duties in the federal government, and it seems odd that
it should proceed so quietly.
Originally, the FTCA set out to be a “general waiver”
of sovereign immunity circumscribed by various excep-
tions. And occasionally, courts still refer to it in that way,
though, at least when the DFE is implicated, it has long
ceased to fulfill that function. The shift from the FTCA’s
original function as a general waiver of sovereign im-
munity to one good only in tightly circumscribed in-
stances makes recovery under the FTCA difficult, to
say the least.
The main waiver provision of the Act is short and
clear: “The United States shall be liable . . . [for] tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances”
(sec. 2674). Section 2680, though, lists 13 exceptions
to this waiver of sovereign immunity. Some of the
exceptions are quite sweeping, but the tiger of the lot
is found in paragraph (a). The Discretionary Function
Exception protects the government against claims
“based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.” Though Robert Jackson (1940) later
maligns the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of
the provision in Dalehite, the terms of the DFE are in
accord with his own stated New Deal impulse to free
the administrator from judicial second-guessing. In
the course of the last half-century, the DFE and other
exceptions in the FTCA have eclipsed Congress’s
intention to make the United States broadly liable
for negligent or malicious policies and decisions of
administrators. The waiver to immunity has become
the exception and the exceptions have become the
rule; the FTCA has been turned inside out.
THE BIG BANG: FROM GENESIS
TO EVOLUTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has visited the DFE on only
four occasions, once in 1952 (Dalehite) and three times
in the seven years spanning 1984–1991 (U.S. v. Varig
Airlines 1984, Berkovitz v. U.S. 1988, and U.S. v. Gaubert
1991).
In Dalehite, after the destruction of Texas City, the
United States and the thousands of plaintiffs who had
filed suit agreed to litigate a “test” case in federal dis-
trict court. All of the parties agreed to be bound by the
results of the case, and the plaintiff won considerable
damages at trial. Facing damages that could aggregate
to more than $200 million (conservatively, $1.4 billion
in year 2002 dollars), the stakes on appeal were enor-
mous. In Dalehite it became clear that the FTCA could
be much more than the means for compensating victims
of governmentally caused injury and death and reliev-
ing Congress of the private bills burden; it could effect
change in government just as expanded tort liability had
changed corporate America. This was the potential re-
sult and regulative power for which Freund had hoped.
The FTCA threatened to allow rank-and-file citizens
to shape the activities and policies of government and
to allow greater judicial oversight of the administrative
process.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing the ap-
peal en banc, reversed the judgment, holding that the
actions of the government in producing and shipping
the FGAN were discretionary acts and therefore came
under the ambit of the DFE. The court also noted that
the DFE clearly indicated Congress’s desire that ad-
ministrators “be free from any unwarranted judicial
supervision” (Texas City Disaster 1952, 778).
The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case in 1952 and,
in a five-to-three decision, affirmed the ruling of the
Fifth Circuit. The Court ruled that Congress did not
intend to subject the sovereign to liability for “acts of
a governmental nature or function” and that upper-
most in Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity were
“the ordinary common-law torts” (Dalehite, 28). The
Court found it “unnecessary to define . . .where dis-
cretion ends,” since the DFE “includes determinations
made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations” (34).
But Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black and
Frankfurter, filed a scathing dissent. Jackson started by
writing that the result of such a sweeping interpretation
of the DFE meant that “the Government . . . can clothe
official carelessness with a public interest. Hence, one
of the unanticipated consequences of the Tort Claims
Act has been to throw the weight of government influ-
ence on the side of lax standards of care” (50). And as
for the Solicitor General’s claim that the government
should not be liable because it tried to emulate stan-
dard industry practice in shipping the FGAN, Jackson
likened the argument to a request for “one free disas-
ter” for each new policy (56).
Dalehite yields the paradoxical result that the greater
the harm inflicted by administrators and their policies,
the more remote the chance that they will be held
accountable for their wrongdoing. As Jackson com-
plained, the maxim that “The King can do no wrong”
has “merely been amended to read, ‘The King can
do only little wrongs’” (60). Lower courts interpreted
Dalehite to set up a planning-operational test for appli-
cation of the DFE. Planning activities were protected,
while mere operational activities, those activities carry-
ing out the details of policies and not invested with pol-
icy discretion, were not protected. For the next 30 years,
the Court let its Dalehite ruling stand undisturbed, until
it perceived that lower courts were taking liberties with
the decision and using the planning-operational test to
expand judicial oversight of administrative actions.
By the 1980s, the Court moved to quell the view that
the interpretation of the DFE “expressed in Dalehite
ha[d] been eroded, if not overruled” (U.S. v. Varig Air-
lines 1984 [hereafter Varig], 811). In Varig, relatives of
passengers who died of smoke and toxic gas inhala-
tion aboard a Boeing 707 sued the federal government
for negligent inspection and certification of the air-
craft. The district court found for the plaintiffs, and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal,
the U.S. Supreme Court provided even broader gov-
ernmental protection than that embraced by Dalehite.
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The Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief
Justice Burger, explained that application of the DFE
depended upon two considerations: “First, it is the na-
ture of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor,
that governs whether the discretionary function excep-
tion applies in a given case”; “Second, [the DFE] plainly
was intended to encompass the discretionary acts of
the Government acting in its role as a regulator of the
conduct of private individuals” (813). The exception is
meant to prevent “judicial ‘second guessing’” of policy
decisions, but only those decisions “grounded in social,
economic, and political policy” (814).
Four years later, another unanimous Court read the
DFE to admit liability for administrators’ negligent li-
censing and release of a lot of live polio vaccine. In
Berkovitz v. U.S. (1988 [hereafter Berkovitz]), the plain-
tiff took live polio vaccine manufactured as Orimune
and contracted polio. The disease permanently para-
lyzed Berkovitz, and he pressed two claims. First, he
asserted that administrators negligently licensed the
vaccine without first receiving testing information as
required by law. Second, he claimed that they released
a noncomplying lot of vaccine against their own regula-
tions and practices. In defense, attorneys for the United
States asserted that all regulatory actions are shielded
from liability by the DFE. If the Court had accepted this
argument, the consequences would have been enor-
mous, since large expanses of governmental activity
would have become immune to suit and judicial review.
But the Court rejected this contention, holding that the
DFE “will not apply when a federal statute, regulation,
or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow” (536). Where there is no discretion
there is no immunity. After Berkovitz, lower courts be-
gan to reinstitute the planning-operational distinction
they had used up to the Varig decision, but the apparent
loosening of judicial construction by the U.S. Supreme
Court proved to be illusory.
In U.S. v. Gaubert (1991 [hereafter Gaubert]), a fed-
eral court of appeals applied a modified planning-
operational distinction and found against the govern-
ment. Administrators of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) exerted heavy control over a bank,
pressuring majority stockholder Thomas Gaubert to
remove himself from management of the bank and to
post a $25 million security interest guaranteeing the
bank’s solvency. The goal of the FHLBB was to force
Gaubert’s bank to merge with a weaker bank ( Gaubert,
319). While Gaubert ran the bank, it was financially
solvent, but after he stepped down, through a series
of perplexing blunders, the FHLBB caused Gaubert’s
bank to fail (320). Gaubert lost his $25 million security
and the value of the shares he held in the bank. The
district court dismissed the case under the DFE, and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed most of the
lower court ruling. But the Court of Appeals also held
that the DFE did not immunize the government for
administrative actions made after assuming control of
the day-to-day operational activities of the bank. The
Supreme Court reversed, stating, “It is clear that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the exception
does not reach decisions made at the operational or
management level of the bank involved in this case”
(325). And in reclaiming territory for the government
that it presumably lost in Berkovitz, the Court noted,
“A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judg-
ment; there is nothing in that description that refers
exclusively to policymaking or planning functions. . . .
Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or
planning level” (325).
The Court reaffirmed the Varig analysis, holding that
judges must determine the following: (1) Did the com-
plained of action or inaction admit of discretion? and
(2) If it did admit of discretion, was it the kind of discre-
tion that Congress sought to immunize from liability?
But the Court also added a requirement that creates
a nearly insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs: “For a
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege
facts which would support a finding that the challenged
actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said
to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime”
(324–5).
This meant that henceforth the burden would be on
the plaintiff to show that the decision is one not “sus-
ceptible to policy analysis” (325). In explaining what
“susceptible to policy analysis” meant, the Court reit-
erated its phrase from Varig. Decisions are protected
if they implicate “social, economic, and political” pol-
icy (Gaubert, 323; Varig, 814). Very few decisions by
bureaucrats cannot be squeezed into the frame of this
ruling. Gaubert appears to be part of the Court’s new-
found respect for sovereign immunity in general and
state sovereign immunity in particular. And Gaubert,
along with cases such as Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida (1996) and Alden v. Maine (1999), signals that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is as vigorous today
as it was at the beginning of the Republic. In Gaubert,
again, there were no dissents, with only Justice Scalia
filing a concurring opinion.
Gaubert reemphasized the formidable nature of the
DFE and gave it a scope and strength beyond what it
had in the past. And the Department of Justice wishes
to husband this strength; using it only where the stakes
are high so that it is not overused and therefore loses
potency. For example, U.S. Attorneys are required to
“obtain approval from the appropriate Torts Branch
Staff prior to raising the ’discretionary function excep-
tion’ defense. . .” (Deptartment of Justice 2001, sec. 4-
5.220). This is the only exception to the FTCA that
requires prior approval before being used and, appar-
ently, the only defense in any circumstances that must
be cleared by the Department of Justice. It is clear that
the DFE is the brightest flower in the “garland of pre-
rogatives” that surrounds the sovereign in civil matters
(Francis Bacon, quoted in Pollock and Maitland [1895]
1968, 517). But our citizens pay a steep price for the
maintenance of this broad protection for governmental
action.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DFE CASES
To understand the DFE better, this section examines
377 federal circuit courts of appeals cases where the
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DFE is invoked. These cases span the time period be-
tween the first appellate decision on the DFE, May 4,
1950, and March 7, 2001, and include all reported cases
where courts ruled on assertion of the DFE or indi-
cated in dicta how they would have ruled if they had
reached that issue. Cases were selected using key word
searches and other means on Lexis/Nexis and West-
law and coded by the authors based on the nature of
the issue, potential impacts, the characteristics of the
plaintiff, and the successful use of the DFE. Based on
these codes, assertion of the DFE succeeded 72% of
the time with federal courts of appeals. Seventy-two
percent of the appellate court decisions affirmed lower
court rulings.
This descriptive overview of cases related to the DFE
at the federal appeals courts level indicates consider-
able consistency. In other words, most cases are related
to similar causes, the defense is successful most of the
time, and lower court decisions are usually affirmed.
However, this consistency reflects appeals decisions
over 50 years and obscures patterns and variation over
time.
Growth of the Use of the DFE
Since Dalehite, the numbers of cases brought to the
federal courts of appeals have fluctuated. For the first
30 years, from 1950 to 1980, the average number of
DFE cases is only two per year. The average during the
period from 1980 to 2000 is 15 cases. Further, as indi-
cated in Figure 1, there has been exponential growth in
the number of cases heard, reaching a high of 27 cases
in 1997. This growth tracks the increasing number of
cases handled by the federal court system over the last
40 years. Civil appeals in federal appellate courts in-
creased 10-fold between 1960 and 2000 and continue
to grow (Federal Court Management Statistics 2000
Krafka, Cecil, and Lombard 1995, 3).
Success of the DFE Defense
It is logical to theorize that as the DFE’s use grows, its
efficacy should also increase. In addition, as discussed
above, several landmark cases strengthened the DFE.
For most of the period from 1950 through 1985, there
are too few cases reported by the federal appeals courts
to draw strong inferences. As a result, success rates
range from 100 to 0%, and for several years in the 1970s,
the success rate oscillates between 100 and about 50%
(Figure 2). During the period from 1980 to 2000, the
number of cases grows and a more accurate pattern
emerges. From 1980 to 1990, the percentage successful
invocations of the DFE ranges from 40% in 1982 to
nearly 90% in 1985 and then decreases to 50% in 1989.
After 1990, the percentage of successful use of the DFE
grows rapidly, to nearly 90% in 1992, the year after
Gaubert, and then consistently remains over 70%. The
average success rate of the DFE is 85% from 1991 to
2000.
We examined three specific dimensions, based on a
reading and coding of each of the 377 cases, to shed ad-
ditional light on the DFE. Based on the coding protocol
outlined below, we found that the intercoder reliabil-
ity of these dimensions conducted by the authors was
100%. Issues that might have an impact on the likely
successful use of the DFE include the following:
(1) The number of actual and potential plaintiffs; a mea-
sure of the potential financial liability of the federal
government. Determining the number of potential
plaintiffs is straightforward in the large majority of
cases: (a) We add up the number of named plain-
tiffs in a case; and (b) we determine the number
of unnamed potential plaintiffs who could sue the
government for the same underlying event giving
rise to the case in question. In no instance did we en-
counter the problem of multiple cases arising from
the same event, since federal civil and appellate
procedure almost always requires such cases to be
merged into a single action.
(2) Whether a bureaucratic decision involving admin-
istrative discretion was minimal or substantial. This
information came from the facts of the case and de-
scriptions of the actions of government employees,
and we asked (a) Did a federal employee directly
participate in or undertake the actions that caused
the injury? and (b) If not, was the injury so closely
connected to substantial governmental regulation
over the subject matter that it met the functional
equivalent of direct participation?
(3) Whether the broader policy implications are min-
imal, moderate, or substantial. First, we asked if,
in the event of a finding of liability, a supervising
administrator with control over the environment in
question could reasonably make changes in policy
to increase safety. This is a threshold question in
that if the answer is “no,” then ipso facto the ef-
fects on policy of a government loss are minimal.
If the threshold is met, then we asked if the pol-
icy changes would be local, regional, or national in
scope. In some cases policy changes would be con-
fined to a particular locale and so would not have
moderate or substantial affect on federal govern-
mental policy. If policy changes would be national
in scope, the case gained at least a “moderate”
classification. If a loss in a case would cause the
government to adopt new policies at the national
level and would cause major expense or substan-
tially redefine the duties of employees, we classified
the case in the “substantial” category.
Number of Actual Potential Plaintiffs. The issue of
the number of actual and potential plaintiffs examines
whether the federal appeals courts are making consid-
erations of the applicability of the DFE based on the
potential scope of the financial impact of liability, rather
than strictly on the merits of the case. In cases where
the number of people affected is very large, then the
successful use of the DFE should increase. When cases
are coded based on the number of people affected, in
73% of the cases between one and 10 people are af-
fected, in 8% of the cases between 11 and 100 people
are affected, and in 17% of the cases over 100 people
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FIGURE 1. Total DFE Cases, 1950–2000
FIGURE 2. Percentage Successful Use of the DFE, 1950–2000
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are affected. While these cutoffs are somewhat arbi-
trary, they suggest a low, middle, and substantial scope
of impact.
There is no association between the number of
people affected and the successful use of the DFE
(χ2= 1.02, p= 0.602). Overall, the DFE is used suc-
cessfully 72% of the time. When fewer people are af-
fected, the success rate is slightly lower than average
(70% for the low and 72% for the middle categories).
When the number of people affected is substantial
(over 100) the DFE is successful 77% of the time, but
again, this difference is not large enough to reach statis-
tical significance. We note, though, that in class action
suits against the U.S. Government under the FTCA, the
DFE, when raised, is successful 100% of the time.
Involvement of the Bureaucracy. Because protection
of the exercise of administrative discretion is the key
principle of the DFE, when there is substantial bureau-
cratic involvement the DFE should be more likely to
succeed. Conversely, when the role of the bureaucracy
is minimal, the DFE should be less likely to succeed. In
54% of the cases the level of bureaucratic involvement
is minimal, and 46% of the time the level of bureau-
cratic involvement is substantial. There is no statistical
association between the level of bureaucratic involve-
ment and the successful use of the DFE (χ2= 0.293,
p= 0.588). The DFE is successful in 73% of the cases
where bureaucratic involvement is minimal and 70%
of the cases where bureaucratic involvement is more
substantial.
Policy Implications. When the policy implications of
the case are substantial, the DFE should be more likely
to succeed. In 36% of the cases, the policy implications
are minimal, in 31% of the cases the policy implications
are moderate, and in 33% of the cases the policy impli-
cations are substantial. There is a statistically significant
association between policy implications and the suc-
cessful use of the DFE (χ2= 16.86, p= 0.000). In 65%
of cases with minimal policy implications and 64% of
cases with moderate policy implications the DFE is suc-
cessful, compared to 85% of cases with substantial pol-
icy impact. This finding indicates that where a govern-
mental loss in a case will work substantial changes on
federal policy, the courts are substantially more likely to
sustain the government’s assertion of the DFE. This re-
sult stands in line with traditional New Deal principles
of judicial deference to agency action. Where liability
threatens “judicial sabotage” of agency independence,
the judiciary is more likely to accept assertion of the
DFE.
Predicting DFE Success. Logistic regression analysis
is used to understand better the circumstances in which
the DFE is mostly likely to be successful. The likelihood
of success is examined as a function of the number of
people potentially affected, the extent of involvement
of the bureaucracy, and the policy consequences of the
case.
When these three variables are included for all
377 cases, the model is statistically significant (model
χ2= 13.55). As suggested by the bivariate analysis pre-
sented above, only the policy implications of the case
are a statistically significant predictor of the likelihood
that the DFE will be successful. The coefficient is for the
number of people affected and is not in the expected
direction. As the number of people affected increases,
the likelihood that the government will allow itself to be
sued increases (DFE not successful), however, this vari-
able is not statistically significant. Bureaucratic involve-
ment is in the expected direction but also is not statisti-
cally significant. Using the logistic regression to predict
a “best case” for success, we find that for a case that
involves many people and has substantial bureaucratic
involvement and policy implications, the likelihood is
that the DFE will be successful 80% of the time. The
likelihood of success for the least favorable case, where
many people are involved, there is little bureaucratic
involvement, and there are no policy implications, is
60%.
As noted above, there is a clear difference during the
pre- and the post-1980 periods in terms of the number
of cases per year and the likelihood of success. Using
the same model to examine cases since 1980, we find
that the best-case scenario for DFE success is 79%, and
in the worst case scenario the probability is 65%. These
changes in the findings indicate that the application of
the DFE is basically the same for the periods before and
after the growth of the DFE began in 1980 (joint log
likelihood test; χ2= 6.71, not statistically significant).
The DFE is slightly more successful under the worst-
case scenario (from 0.60 to 0.65), which shows that the
federal appeals courts have broadened the scope of the
DFE to cases that affect fewer people and have low
policy significance and bureaucratic involvement.
The same model was also run for the cases between
1990 and 2000. This period represents relative stability
in the number of cases decided each year and increas-
ingly consistent and high support of the DFE by federal
appeals courts. The period from 1990 to 2000 is sta-
tistically different from the years prior to 1990 (joint
log likelihood test; χ2= 13.93, p< 0.05). This logis-
tic regression is not statistically significant (χ2= 2.23,
p= 0.526) and none of the case characteristics are sta-
tistically significant predictors of the outcome of the
case.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DFE
There are three types of suspect consequences created
by the DFE with which we are concerned: constitu-
tional, informational, and policy consequences. Issues
of accountability are distributed among these areas in
the discussion below.
Constitutional Consequences
The statutory nature of the FTCA does not mean that
it does not fulfill important functions in our constitu-
tional framework. It has, after all, largely taken over
the private bill function from Congress. Even before
the statutory exception to the waiver of sovereign im-
munity found in the DFE, the courts had provided for
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something similar through the common law and con-
struction of constitutional principles. Indeed, statutes
exposing the government to liability that do not specif-
ically contain a discretionary function exemption have
been read to contain the provision implicitly. The DFE
contained in the FTCA, as it has been fleshed out by the
courts, is frequently imported into cases involving the
Suits in Admiralty Act (1920), the Public Vessels Act
(1925), and other statutes, even though those statutes
do not contain a DFE clause. The DFE is not only
an exception to a waiver of sovereign immunity, but
also a firewall to preserve the doctrine of separation of
powers in private actions against the government. The
Supreme Court reaffirms time and again that the sepa-
ration of powers is a “vital check against tyranny” and
a “fundamental principle[] of the Government estab-
lished by the Framers of the Constitution” (Buckley v.
Valeo 1976, 120–1). In the scales balanced by the Court,
it is not just the arcane ancient doctrine of sovereign im-
munity on one side and injustice on the other. Added
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity is concern for
the functional integrity of our constitutional structure,
and these two together, in the Court’s eyes, gener-
ally outweigh the admitted injustice caused by the
DFE.
But we think that the Court cuts a berth too wide
of Congress and the President and ignores that the
fundamental motivation behind the FTCA was to shift
the burden for determining governmental liability from
Congress to the judiciary. As discussed above, the main
reason for this shift was to relieve Congress of the
annoying and debilitating burden of private bills. But
another, barely less substantial, motivation was to see
that justice is done for those injured and killed by ad-
ministrative negligence or malevolence. Congress itself
reported that “the United States courts are well able
and equipped to hear these claims and to decide them
with justice” (U.S. Congress, Senate 1946, 25). Judicial
deference in many DFE cases amounts, we think, to
abdication by the courts of their constitutional respon-
sibilities for oversight of Congress and the Executive
and causes both unnecessary injustice and an unwise
enlargement of Executive power.
Depriving the Public of Information
The DFE is a jurisdictional bar; when it operates, fed-
eral courts are without power to hear the case. So where
the DFE is successful, it prevents not only trial but,
much of the time, discovery. This means that there is
no opportunity for the plaintiff to force production of
evidence from the government. This makes the DFE a
useful device to prevent the disclosure of embarrassing
or politically explosive information. For example, in
Consolidated Atmospheric Testing, in re (1987 [here-
after Consolidated]), the district court dismissed the
case under the DFE before any discovery of govern-
ment documents and witnesses could be accomplished.
In this case, a large number of plaintiffs sued gov-
ernment contractors for illness and death due to their
exposure to radiation through nuclear weapons man-
ufacture and fallout from aboveground weapons tests.
The fallout victims, “downwinders,” as Howard Ball
(1986, 197) concludes in an exhaustive study of the sub-
ject, were “misinformed about their safety, they were
trapped in a bureaucratic operation that prevented the
truth from emerging about the actual levels of radiation
exposure.” Congress, in what came to be known as the
Warner Amendment, acted to cut off money damages
remedies for these victims by making suit against the
government under the FTCA the only available legal
action for radiation exposure.2 This meant either that
suits against contractors and other nongovernmental
businesses and personnel were dismissed or that the
government was substituted as the defendant.
Of course, Congress could not but anticipate that the
government would prevail in these suits based on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and the DFE. In Con-
solidated, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the district court’s dismissal of the suit under the DFE,
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari (see, sub
nomine, Konizeski v. Livermore Labs 1988). Congress’s
actions funneled victims into a headlong collision with
the DFE, which offered little chance for recovery or
even the opportunity to find the truth concerning the
actions of administrators and contractors. It played out
as expected, and when the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari it cut off legal recovery for over half a million
victims and their families.3
But not only did the victims lose, but also the rest of
the public. In some circumstances, discovery and trial
are the most efficient means to unearth information
about government practices. In this way, suit against the
government complements regulatory goals of the First
Amendment by providing important material showing
what sorts of things the government is doing or has
done in the past. Counsel who authored the unsuccess-
ful Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court in Consolidated, later commented,
Had Congress permitted the suits to proceed, the plaintiffs
would have been able through civil discovery to compel the
production of a great deal of information about the man-
ner in which the government and the contractors carried
2 Congress adopted section 1631 of the Department of Energy Na-
tional Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Autho-
rization Act of 1985, codified at 42 U.S.C. section 2212. This provision
holds that an action against the United States under the FTCA shall
be the exclusive remedy for injuries “due to exposure to radiation
based on acts or omissions by a contractor in carrying out an atomic
weapons testing program under a contract with the United States”
[sec. 2212(a)(1)]. The Act applied “without regard to when the act
or omission occurred” [sec. 2212(a)(2)] and to existing cases that had
not culminated in a final, unreviewable judgment (see Hammond v.
U.S. 1986). A serious threat to eliminate this provision came in the
summer of 1990 in debate and amendment on the National Defense
Authorization Act. More than 40 senators cosponsored legislation
to repeal the Warner Amendment, including Senator Warner. The
legislation failed.
3 This estimate includes 220 thousand military personnel, 150 thou-
sand civilian contract workers, and 170 thousand “downwinders” of
test blasts (Congressional Record 1990, S12119). The government
purposely did not warn these victims in order to facilitate long-
term studies of the effects of radiation fallout (see, e.g., Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory 1984 and U.S. Deptartment of
Energy 1995, 24–30).
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out the atomic tests, about the numbers and identities of
exposed veterans, [and] about what the contractors and the
government knew of the hazards of radiation at the time
of the tests. . . . (Fletcher 1990, 308–9)
Although many in Congress were ambivalent about the
disclosure of atomic testing information, a few mem-
bers were decidedly against any disclosure. Senator
Pete Domenici, for example, in arguing against a popu-
lar, though ultimately unsuccessful, effort to repeal the
Warner Amendment, said that “lawyers . . . are kind of
itching, just salivating [about suing the U.S. Govern-
ment in radiation exposure cases]” and are acting not
out of interest for their clients or even for money, “but
to get their hands on the documents that are in the
national laboratories so they can expose the American
people what [sic] went on the past 50 years” (Congres-
sional Record 1990, S12119).
It is difficult to see what damage disclosure of docu-
ments in this area would have had except for embar-
rassment. Most of these documents have now been
released, and many thousands are available on the
Web through government servers. These disclosures,
though controversial, had salutary effects on our soci-
ety and government. Senator Domenici and those who
worked to defeat the repeal of the Warner Amend-
ment were nearsighted. Embarrassment at disclosure
is also a means of accountability, a way of control-
ling administrative behavior, and courts flatly reject
potential embarrassment as a basis for prior restraint
or criminal prosecution in the disclosure of government
documents. As Justice Douglas noted, “The dominant
purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of
embarrassing information” (New York Times Co. v. U.S.
1971, 723–4).
Unless an injured party, especially after Gaubert, al-
ready has facts in hand to show that a policy violation
occurred or that the decision was not discretionary, he
or she will frequently not have the opportunity to force
government production of evidence pertinent to the
case.
Policy and Directive Formulation
Government attorneys and policymakers know that
liability will arise when an agent of the government
violates a specific and clear directive. As discussed in
Berkovitz, the government’s negligent release of a vac-
cine lot that failed to conform to specified standards
drew liability. This standard for recovery in some cir-
cumstances gives no incentive for administrators and
policymakers to develop policies and directives aimed
at protecting the public. Administrators can simply opt
to write no standards or specific directives in those
situations where that is possible. As a circuit court of
appeals in a recent case found, “The random and un-
codified practices of a local supervisor cannot create
the kind of specific obligation that gives rise to liability”
(Irving v. U.S. 1998, 168). This finding, and others like
it, encourages administrators to adopt vague policies.
The public policy goals of tort law are predicated on
a number of effects that liability has on actors. Among
these is the aim of increased safety by visiting liability
on people best positioned to cause changes in policy
and practice. But the DFE preempts these effects, and
poor policies, or policies that cause avoidable dangers,
go unexposed and unchanged; “[a] predicament . . . at
odds with the FTCA’s promise to treat the government
like a ’private person’ for purposes of tort liability”
(Levine 2000, 1542). We do not rule out the possibil-
ity that agencies will change their behavior because of
attempted yet unsuccessful litigation. But the high suc-
cess rate of the DFE and the extremely small chance
that any suit will be successful provide little impetus
for administrators to revisit policies after unsuccessful
suits.
Additionally, administrators engage in two practices
that further immunize agencies and personnel from ac-
countability. The first of these is founded upon statutes
that allow for the United States to substitute itself for
named defendants in certain circumstances. The West-
fall Act (1988, sec. 2679(d)(1)) allows the government
to substitute itself as defendant for a federal worker
when the Attorney General certifies that the worker
was acting within the scope of his or her employment
when the injury occurred. Once the government is sub-
stituted as defendant, the problem is shifted from the
employee and agency in question to the Department of
Justice. The offending employee and his or her agency
are not made to internalize the costs of their actions.
The second practice that insulates administrators
from accountability is found in the way the United
States pays out judgments when it does lose to a plain-
tiff. Even if a plaintiff is successful in suit against
the government or negotiates a settlement, judgments
larger than specified dollar amounts for each agency
are paid out of a judgment fund maintained by the
Department of the Treasury’s Financial Management
Service (FMS) (1998, 1999). For example, judgments
in excess of $25 thousand against the FBI are referred
to the FMS for payment. Further, any judgments paid
from the fund do not come out of the offending agency’s
budget. Thus there is no incentive for administrators
to reevaluate policies and procedures in the wake of
liability, since they do not have to provide the legal
resources to defend their agencies or pay judgments.
Former Attorney General Reno (1997) remarked, “I
came to Washington to discover that a client agency
oftentimes has a judgment paid out of a judgment fund
rather than its regular appropriation. It doesn’t hurt.
So there’s not that much of an incentive. Let the Justice
Department worry about it.”
The Department of Justice Torts Division has be-
come adept at handling problems not its own, injuries
it did not inflict. It draws accountability away from of-
fending agencies and flawed or even malicious policies,
thus alleviating the need to evaluate those policies in
light of the injuries they cause to citizens. Increased
success of the DFE, coupled with the Westfall Act and
the operation of the judgment fund, leads to precisely
the sort of unchecked discretion that thinkers reacting
to New Deal administrative theory feared most.
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CONCLUSION
There are often good reasons and uses for the reten-
tion of sovereign immunity, even when administrators
act negligently or intentionally in harming citizens. But
this retention of immunity should be carefully circum-
scribed so that the beneficial functions of making the
government vulnerable to suit are not undermined. Ad-
ministrators, though, most vigorously assert immunity
where the damage imposed on society is greatest. This
means that often neither the oversight function of ad-
ministrative action transferred by Congress to the judi-
ciary in the FTCA nor the ameliorative effects of liabil-
ity will reach government administrators. By admission
of the Chief of the Torts Branch, Department of Justice
(Axelrad 2001), when government caused injuries are
far reaching, as in the class action suits of Consolidated
Atmospheric Testing, in re (1987) and Agent Orange, in
re (1987), the DFE is the primary means for preventing
liability or discovery. Indeed, the United States won
in all eight reported federal courts of appeals cases in
which it raised the DFE to protect itself against class
actions.
With such a successful tool available, the temptation
to use it is understandably strong, and this substantially
affects our constitutional system and governmental ac-
countability. In giving too much deference to the sepa-
ration of powers and the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, the federal judiciary created an environment that
sometimes does not encourage administrators to use
care or to abandon unnecessarily injurious policies. The
DFE is an anachronism, a living remnant of New Deal
faith in the expert agency that must be free of judicial
sabotage. Although the effectiveness and advisability
of comprehensive judicial oversight of administrative
agencies are a contentious issue, in the case of the
FTCA and the DFE many of the standard reasons for
deferring to administrative discretion are less convinc-
ing than in other circumstances. In the context of the
DFE, judges do not order agencies to forgo or modify
policies, nor do they substitute their judgment for that
of the administrator. Considering the operation of the
judgment fund, one cannot even say that imposition of
liability is the functional equivalent of replacement of
agency expertise by judge-made predilection. No doubt
liability does prompt policy changes, but it is unpersua-
sive to claim that administrators who do not feel the
sting of monetary damages under the FTCA are nev-
ertheless under judicial coercion to change or modify
policies causing injury.
Reinterpreting the DFE narrowly and expanding ju-
dicial power to influence agency policies and practices
could expose agencies to greater public scrutiny. Infor-
mation made public through legal action may also pro-
vide impetus and guidance for congressional efforts at
agency oversight. As Raoul Berger testified, Congress
cannot perform its duty to investigate agencies “from
hell to breakfast” (U.S. Congress, House 1972, 3132)
without information “as to what is going on in the
subterranean depths of the executive branch” (3116).
Sometimes one of the best ways of plumbing those
“subterranean depths” is by means of a suit in tort.
Above all, we cannot forget the interests of the
deserving plaintiffs who nonetheless are cut off from
justice by operation of the DFE. Lawrence Friedman
(1985, 43), in his book Total Justice, claims that “general
expectations” of recompense and justice have become
“superprinciples” in our society. It would be difficult,
though, to find a more severe violation of “total justice”
than the DFE, and it thwarts Friedman’s “superprinci-
ples” with astonishing frequency.
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